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Abstract
The paper considers a matching with contracts model in the presence of price controls. The model con-
tains two important streams in the matching literature, those with and those without monetary transfers, as 
special cases. An adjustment process that ends with a stable outcome is presented. The paper presents a 
notion of competitive equilibrium, called Drèze equilibrium, and shows Drèze equilibrium allocations to be 
equivalent to allocations induced by stable outcomes. We therefore have an equivalence that is valid with 
and without monetary transfers as well as when monetary transfers are limited.
© 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
JEL classification: C71; C78; D45; D51
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1. Introduction
Although standard analysis assumes prices to be completely flexible, price controls and price 
regulations are actually very common, see, e.g., Nguyen and Whalley (1990) and Levy (1991). 
Typical examples include minimum wages in the labor market and upper bounds on rents in 
housing markets.
From a substantive point of view, the analysis of competitive models with price controls is 
very different from the one without price controls, caused by the fact that due to the price con-
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markets, but so do quantities in the form of supply and demand rationing. Typical examples are 
unemployment on the labor market and waiting lists in the social housing sector. Unlike compet-
itive equilibria in models without price controls, which are Pareto efficient, equilibria in models 
with price controls are typically Pareto inefficient, even when restricting attention to allocations 
that are consistent with the given price controls (Herings and Konovalov, 2009).
Many of the examples of markets with price controls, like the housing market or the labor 
market, are characterized by extensive heterogeneity. An alternative to competitive analysis is 
therefore to use concepts from matching theory. This paper compares both approaches in a 
one-to-one matching with contracts model in the spirit of Hatfield and Milgrom (2005), where 
contract prices may be subject to price controls. Buyers and sellers trade commodities by signing 
contracts, where a contract specifies a buyer, a seller, a commodity, and a price. The price of a 
contract is subject to a price floor and a price ceiling, and therefore restricted to belong to some 
interval. The price floor is allowed to be equal to minus infinity and the price ceiling may be 
equal to plus infinity.
Two important streams in the matching literature, those with and those without monetary 
transfers, can be seen as special cases. The case without monetary transfers like the marriage 
problem of Gale and Shapley (1962) follows by specifying both the lower and the upper bound 
on the price to be equal to zero. The case with unrestricted monetary transfers like the assignment 
model of Shapley and Shubik (1971) follows by setting the interval of feasible prices equal to 
the set of real numbers. Other special cases are Talman and Yang (2008) and Andersson and 
Svensson (2014), who consider the assignment model with price controls, and Hatfield et al.
(2012, 2016), who study how the presence of price controls leads to quality competition.
An alternative way to bridge models in the literatures with and without monetary transfers is 
presented in Jaffe and Kominers (2014). They consider a model where transfers are subject to 
taxation. The model with tax rates equal to zero corresponds to the standard model with monetary 
transfers and the model with tax rates equal to one to the model without monetary transfers.
There are several papers that have established a connection between stable outcomes and 
competitive equilibria for the case of unlimited monetary transfers. Shapley and Shubik (1971)
consider the assignment game with transferable utility and prove that the set of stable payoffs 
coincides with the set of competitive equilibrium payoffs. Kaneko (1982) and Quinzii (1984)
extend this result to the case where utility functions are not assumed to be quasi-linear. When 
allowing for personalized prices and assuming quasi-linear utility functions, such a result can be 
extended to many-to-many matching set-ups or even trading networks as has been demonstrated 
by Hatfield et al. (2013).
The equivalence results are invariably derived in a setting with unlimited monetary transfers, 
or, equivalently, absence of price controls. When discussing the connection between competitive 
markets and stability in the context of the marriage model, Shapley and Scarf (1974), p. 35, re-
mark that: “It does not appear to be possible to set up a conventional market for this model, in 
such a way that a competitive price equilibrium will exist and lead to an allocation in the core.” 
This paper presents a fully general equivalence between stable outcomes and competitive equi-
libria. This equivalence boils down to the equivalence with competitive equilibria in the absence 
of price controls, presents a completely new result for cases with no monetary transfers like the 
marriage problem, and also deals with all intermediate cases like wage or rent controls. Our con-
cept of competitive equilibrium in the matching with contracts model under price controls is an 
extension of the contribution by Drèze (1975), who introduces price rigidities in the standard 
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equilibrium.
We prove the existence of stable outcomes and, by the equivalence result, of Drèze equilibria 
by means of an adjustment process in the style of Gale and Shapley (1962), Crawford and Knoer
(1981), Kelso and Crawford (1982), Demange et al. (1986), and Hatfield and Milgrom (2005). 
This process is shown to always terminate with a stable outcome in a discretized version of the 
model and we next use a limit argument. When applied to the marriage problem, the adjustment 
process is identical to the deferred acceptance algorithm of Gale and Shapley (1962). When 
applied to the assignment model, the adjustment process is identical to the generalization of the 
approximate auction mechanism with personalized prices as discussed in Section V of Demange 
et al. (1986).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model of matching with contracts 
under price controls and shows how many contributions in the literature are included as special 
cases. Section 3 presents and illustrates the notions of stable outcome and Drèze equilibrium. 
Section 4 provides an illustrating example. Section 5 shows stable outcomes to exist. Section 6
is devoted to the equivalence between allocations induced by stable outcomes and Drèze equilib-
rium allocations. Section 7 contains the conclusion.
2. Matching under price controls
There is a finite set of buyers B and a finite set of sellers S who trade commodities in a finite 
set L and a good labeled 0, which we call money. The set of all agents is I = B ∪ S. Trade in 
commodities takes place by signing contracts, where a contract is an element y = (b, s, , m) ∈
B × S ×L ×R. A given contract y = (b, s, , m) involves a buyer β(y) = b, a seller σ(y) = s, a 
commodity λ(y) = , and an amount of money μ(y) = m. The set of agents involved in contract 
y is ι(y) = {β(y), σ(y)}. We consider a one-to-one matching set-up, so a buyer signs a contract 
with at most one seller and a seller with at most one buyer.
For a set of contracts Y ⊂ B × S × L × R, the set of contracts involving buyer b is given 
by Yb = Y ∩ β−1({b}) = {y ∈ Y | β(y) = b} and the set of contracts involving seller s by Y s =
Y ∩σ−1({s}) = {y ∈ Y | σ(y) = s}. Similarly, the set of contracts involving commodity  is given 
by Y = Y ∩ λ−1({}) = {y ∈ Y | λ(y) = }. Throughout the paper, superscripts refer to agents 
and subscripts to commodities.
The amount of money involved in a contract may be subject to price controls. The price of a 
commodity  ∈ L is subject to a price floor p

∈ {−∞} ∪R and a price ceiling p¯ ∈R ∪ {+∞}. 
The set of admissible prices is now equal to P = {p ∈ RL | p ≤ p ≤ p¯}. To ensure that the set 
of admissible prices is non-empty, it is assumed that p ≤ p¯. One extreme but highly relevant 
case is where no monetary transfers are allowed. This is achieved by setting p

= p¯ = 0. In 
applications related to social housing, it is common that the rent m to be paid for an apartment 
of type  is fixed, which corresponds to setting p

= p¯ = m. The case with unlimited monetary 
transfers follows by specifying p

= −∞ and p¯ = +∞. Both price floors and price ceilings are 
allowed to be negative.
In many settings, it is not possible for every buyer to supply every commodity to every seller. 
Some specific examples are presented later. The set of feasible trades is given by T , a subset of 
B × S × L. The set T generates the set of feasible contracts Y¯ defined as the set of all contracts 
with the trade in T and the amount of money satisfying the restrictions imposed by the price 
controls, so
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λ(y)
≤ μ(y) ≤ p¯λ(y)}.
We assume that for every commodity its set of traders has a product structure. Whenever there 
is a trade in T involving commodity  by buyer b1 and seller s1 as well as a trade involving 
commodity  by buyer b2 and seller s2, then there is also a trade in T involving commodity 
by buyer b1 and seller s2, and a trade in T involving commodity  by buyer b2 and seller s1. 
Equivalently, for every  ∈ L, construct the graph with as nodes the buyers β(Y¯) and the sellers 
σ(Y¯) and an edge between a buyer b and a seller s if and only if (b, s, ) ∈ T . Then, for every 
commodity  ∈ L, this yields a complete bipartite graph if and only if its set of traders has a 
product structure.
In general equilibrium models, a commodity is defined by its physical characteristics, time, 
and place of availability. This definition of a commodity is sufficient to guarantee that a given 
commodity is traded against a single price. Since trade is anonymous, the assumption of a prod-
uct structure is automatically satisfied. The assumption of traders in a given commodity having 
a product structure provides a generalization of the standard model to the situation where the 
feasible trades between a buyer and a seller are explicitly specified and is a sufficient condition 
to guarantee that a given commodity is traded against a single price.
In models with a set of feasible trades T , the assumption of a product structure is without loss 
of generality, since any form of trading restrictions can be incorporated in the notion of a com-
modity. For instance, if buyer b1 can acquire some product both from seller s1 and s2, but buyer 
b2 can only purchase this product from s2, then we would define two commodities, say  and ′. 
The set T contains trades in commodity  by buyer b1 and seller s1 and by buyer b1 and seller s2. 
It also contains a trade in commodity ′ by buyer b2 and seller s2. In the extreme, we could define 
as many commodities as there are trades. The resulting notion of competitive equilibrium would 
then correspond to competitive equilibrium with personalized prices as defined in Hatfield et al.
(2013).
When defining equilibrium notions, we require that a commodity is traded against a single 
price. The less commodities there are, the more demanding this requirement is. On the other hand, 
the notion of stable outcome does not depend on the definition of a commodity since the contracts 
that can be written by a pair of agents are not materially affected by this definition. For instance, 
if we introduce as many commodities as trades in the example of the previous paragraph, then 
the set of contracts that can be written is isomorphic to the original set. Our equivalence result 
now implies that as long as the product structure is satisfied, the set of equilibrium allocations is 
not affected by the definition of a commodity, though the set of supporting prices may.
The commodities that can be traded by an agent i ∈ I are defined by
Li = λ(Y¯ i) = { ∈ L | ∃y ∈ Y¯ i such that λ(y) = }.
We assume that ∪b∈BLb = ∪s∈SLs = L. For  ∈ L, let e() be the -th unit vector in RL. Then 
the set of feasible contracts Y¯ defines the consumption set Xb of a buyer b ∈ B to be equal to
Xb =R× ({0L} ∪ {e() |  ∈ Lb}),
where 0L denotes the zero vector in RL and corresponds to the case where the buyer does not sign 
any contract. The unit vector e() results when buyer b signs a contract involving commodity . 
The first component of a vector xb ∈ Xb denotes the amount of money consumed and is denoted 
by xb0 . If buyer b signs a contract involving an amount of money m, then x
b
0 = −m. If buyer b
does not sign a contract, then xb = 0.0
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Xs =R× ({0L} ∪ {−e() |  ∈ Ls}),
where we make the usual convention that the supply of commodity  by a seller s results in a 
negative consumption, xs = −e(). If seller s signs a contract involving an amount of money m, 
then xs0 = m. If seller s does not sign a contract, then xs0 = 0.
We denote X =∏i∈I Xi .
The preferences of an agent i ∈ I are represented by a utility function ui : Xi → R. The 
concept of a commodity encompasses all utility relevant information. For a buyer the utility of 
a commodity does not depend on the agent delivering it, and for a seller the utility of a com-
modity is independent of the identity of its buyer. This assumption is without loss of generality. 
Whenever such information is relevant, it can be included in the description of a commodity.
Utility functions are assumed to be continuous and strongly monotonic in x0. There are 
limits to the monetary transfers buyers are willing to make for commodities without price 
ceilings. For every b ∈ B , for every  ∈ Lb such that p¯ = +∞, there is m ∈ R such that 
ub(−m, e()) ≤ ub(0, 0L). There are limits to the monetary transfers sellers are willing to make 
for commodities without price floors. For every s ∈ S, for every  ∈ Ls such that p

= −∞, 
there is m ∈R such that us(m, −e()) ≤ us(0, 0L). Commodities are allowed to be bads, so for a 
buyer it might be that for some commodity  it holds that ub(0, e()) < ub(0, 0L) and for a seller 
that us(0, −e()) > us(0, 0L). Quasi-linear utility functions are a prominent and commonly used 
example of utility functions satisfying our assumptions.
The primitives of an economy are summarized by E = (T , p, p¯, (ui)i∈I ).
Although simple, this model includes a number of important special cases.
Example 2.1. Gale and Shapley (1962), marriage problem.
A community consists of n men and n women. Each person ranks those of the oppositive sex 
in accordance with his or her preferences for a marriage partner. Monetary transfers are not 
allowed. We define B as the set of men, S as the set of women, and the set of commodities as 
L = B ×S. This is clearly a case with many trading restrictions, since buyers and sellers are both 
restricted to trade in the commodity carrying their label, T = {(b, s, ) ∈ B × S ×L |  = (b, s)}. 
A commodity corresponds to a contract between a man and a woman. The absence of monetary 
transfers is achieved by setting p = p¯ = 0L. Utility functions are now specified in accordance 
with each person’s ranking of the partners of opposite sex, with the utility of remaining single 
strictly below the lowest utility assigned to a partner when x0 = 0. Since monetary transfers are 
not possible, the specification of the utility function is immaterial for other values of x0. Since 
there are as many commodities as there are trades, T trivially has a product structure.
Example 2.2. Shapley and Shubik (1971), assignment model.
There are m homeowners in the real estate market and n prospective purchasers. Homeowner s
values his house at cs dollars, while purchaser b values the same house at hbs dollars. There are 
no restrictions on monetary transfers. We define B as the set of prospective purchasers, S as the 
set of homeowners, and the set of commodities as L = S. A commodity corresponds to a house. 
Again, there are many trading restrictions, since a seller is restricted to trade in the house bearing 
his label, T = {(b, s, ) ∈ B × S ×L |  = s}. There are no restrictions on monetary transfers, so 
for every  ∈ L we set p = −∞ and p¯ = +∞. The utility of a buyer b ∈ B is given by
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∑
s∈S
hbsxs .
The utility of a seller s ∈ S is equal to
us(x) = x0 + csxs .
It is easily verified that this application satisfies all the assumptions made before.
Notice that a commodity depends on both the buyer and the seller in the marriage problem of 
Example 2.1, but only on the seller in the assignment model of Example 2.2.
Example 2.3. Hatfield et al. (2012), quality competition in the presence of price controls.
Several authors have argued that the presence of price controls affects the commodity which is 
traded on the market. For instance, Leffler (1982) argues that price ceilings give rise to the sup-
ply of inefficiently low quality. Other authors, like Feldstein (1973), have studied the effect of 
minimum wages on job quality, and Agell and Lommerud (1997) analyze the effects of mini-
mum wages on worker’s skill formation. To study the effects of price controls on traded quality, 
Hatfield et al. (2012) develop a model of quality competition.
The set of commodities is L = {1, . . . , ¯}. Commodities have universally agreed upon quali-
ties, with the quality of commodity  exceeding the quality of commodity k if and only if  ≥ k. 
Commodities are therefore referred to as qualities. There is a price control that specifies a com-
mon price floor f for all qualities: for every  ∈ L, p

= f . There are no price ceilings, so for 
every  ∈ L, p¯ = +∞. The value for buyer b of procuring any quality is given by vb ≥ 0, and v
denotes the additional utility derived from procuring quality . To obtain a unique utility repre-
sentation, it is assumed that v1 = 0. For  = 2, . . . , ¯, we define v = v−v−1 as the difference 
in utility between quality  and quality  − 1. It is assumed that v is positive. The utility of a 
buyer b ∈ B is then given by
ub(x) = x0 + vb
∑
∈L
x +
∑
∈L
vx.
Sellers produce at most one quality. The cost for seller s of producing any quality is given by cs ≥
0, and c denotes the additional cost of producing commodity . To obtain a unique representation 
of the costs, it is assumed that c1 = 0. For  = 2, . . . , ¯, we define c = c −c−1 as the increase 
in costs to go from quality  − 1 to quality . It is assumed that c is positive. The utility of a 
seller s ∈ S is given by the profit
us(x) = x0 + cs
∑
∈L
x +
∑
∈L
cx.
3. Stable outcomes and Drèze equilibria
In this section, we present the concept of stable outcome from matching theory and the con-
cept of Drèze equilibrium from general equilibrium theory.
A set of contracts A ⊂ Y¯ is an outcome if each agent is involved in at most one contract, so 
the cardinality of every set Ai is at most one. The set of all outcomes is denoted by the collection 
A = {A ⊂ Y¯ | for every i ∈ I, |Ai | ≤ 1}. In particular, it holds that ∅ ∈ A. For i ∈ I , the col-
lection Ai is defined as the collection containing the empty set together with all sets consisting 
of a single contract that involves agent i. This set corresponds to the set of possible choices for 
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unique allocation ξ(A) ∈ X defined as follows. For every b ∈ B , if Ab = ∅, then ξb(A) = (0, 0L); 
otherwise, let y be the unique contract in Ab and define ξb(A) = (−μ(y), e(λ(y))). For every 
s ∈ S, if As = ∅, then ξ s(A) = (0, 0L); otherwise, let y be the unique contract in As and define 
ξ s(A) = (μ(y), −e(λ(y))). Since every contract specifies the delivery of a commodity from a 
seller to a buyer in exchange for a particular quantity of money, it holds that
∑
i∈I
ξ i(A) = 0. (3.1)
The utility of agent i ∈ I derived from outcome A ∈A is given by
Ui(A) = ui(ξ i(A)).
The choice relation Ci of agent i ∈ I is defined by
Ci(Y ) = arg max
{Ai∈Ai |Ai⊂Y i }
Ui(Ai), Y ⊂ Y¯ .
The set Ci(Y ) contains all the alternatives Ai in the set of possible choices Ai of agent i that are 
a subset of Y i and that maximize his utility. Since in general Ci might be empty-valued, we use 
the term choice relation rather than choice correspondence. In the sequel, we will apply Ci to 
finite sets Y , which guarantees that Ci is not empty-valued. The next definition reformulates the 
stability concept as defined in Roth and Sotomayor (1990) to make it compatible with our set-up.
Definition 3.1. An outcome A ∈A is stable if:
1. For every i ∈ I , Ai ∈ Ci(A).
2. For every z = (b, s, , m) ∈ Y¯ it holds that Ub({z}) ≤ Ub(A) or Us({z}) ≤ Us(A).
A stable outcome A involves only contracts in the set of feasible contracts Y¯ and at most one 
contract for each agent. The first condition in Definition 3.1 corresponds to individual rationality. 
Every agent i should weakly prefer his current contract to staying inactive. The second condition 
requires absence of blocking by a two-agent coalition.
We now develop a notion of competitive equilibrium for the economy E = (T , p, p¯, (ui)i∈I )
as presented in Section 2. As is usual, see, e.g., Gul and Stacchetti (1999) and Sun and Yang
(2006), at such an equilibrium each commodity is traded against a single price. The initial en-
dowment of every agent i ∈ I is equal to (0, 0L) ∈ Xi .
For economies in which all commodities are perfectly divisible, where consumption sets are 
equal to R+ × RL+, there is an extensive literature on competitive equilibrium under price con-
trols, starting with seminal contributions by Bénassy (1975), Drèze (1975), and Younès (1975). 
Herings (1996) provides an overview of this stream in the literature. Here, we follow the ap-
proach as developed in Drèze (1975) and extend it to the economies with indivisible commodities 
of Section 2.
In a competitive analysis of price controls, there is a price vector p ∈ {1} ×RL against which 
trade in commodities takes place. In the presence of a price floor p and a price ceiling p¯, it 
should hold that p

≤ p ≤ p¯ for every  ∈ L. A buyer b ∈ B chooses a utility maximizing 
element xb ∈ Xb subject to the budget constraint pxb ≤ 0. Similarly, a seller s ∈ S chooses a 
utility maximizing element xs ∈ Xs subject to the budget constraint pxs ≤ 0. Moreover, buyers 
and sellers may face rationing constraints to be explained below.
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quantity adjustments. Since prices are upward rigid, quantity adjustments are on the buyers’ side. 
At a price equal to p¯, a buyer might be willing to buy commodity , but there is no seller willing 
to supply to him at that price. The price ceiling prevents the price from going up. Under such 
circumstances, a buyer faces demand rationing of commodity .
Let Q ⊂ {(b, ) ∈ B × L |  ∈ Lb} be the set of demand rationing constraints. The collection 
of all such sets is denoted by Q, so
Q= {Q ∈ 2B×L | for every (b, ) ∈ Q,  ∈ Lb}.
If (b, ) ∈ Q, then buyer b is rationed in his demand of commodity , and when maximizing his 
utility, he takes into account the constraint xb = 0. The set Q is determined endogenously in an 
equilibrium and could be equal to the empty set in which case no demand rationing is present. For 
b ∈ B , we define Qb = { ∈ L | (b, ) ∈ Q} and for  ∈ L, we define Q = {b ∈ B | (b, ) ∈ Q}. 
The set Qb yields the commodities in which buyer b is rationed in his demand. The set Q
contains the buyers which are rationed in their demand of commodity .
In case the price floor p

is binding for some commodity , its market may be cleared by quan-
tity adjustments. Since prices are downwards rigid, the quantity adjustments are on the sellers’ 
side. Indeed, a seller may not face any demand for commodity  when the price is p

, although 
he is willing to sell commodity  against price p

. Moreover, the price floor prevents the price 
from going down. Under such circumstances, the seller faces supply rationing of commodity .
Let R ⊂ {(s, ) ∈ S × L |  ∈ Ls} be the set of supply rationing constraints. The collection of 
all such sets is denoted by R, so
R= {R ∈ 2S×L | for every (s, ) ∈ R,  ∈ Ls}.
If (s, ) ∈ R, then seller s is rationed in his supply of commodity , and when maximizing his 
utility, he takes into account the constraint xs = 0. The set R is determined endogenously in an 
equilibrium and could be equal to the empty set in which case no supply rationing is present. For 
s ∈ S, we define Rs = { ∈ L | (s, ) ∈ R} and for  ∈ L, we define R = {s ∈ S | (s, ) ∈ R}. The 
set Rs yields the commodities in which seller s is rationed in his supply. The set R contains the 
sellers which are rationed in their supply of commodity .
Given a price vector p ∈ {1} ×RL and a set of rationing constraints Qb ⊂ Lb , the budget set 
of a buyer b ∈ B is given by
γ b(p,Qb) = {xb ∈ Xb | pxb ≤ 0, for every  ∈ Qb, xb = 0}.
The rationing constraints of buyers different from b are irrelevant for the budget set of buyer b
and are therefore suppressed in the definition of γ b. The demand correspondence δb of buyer b
is defined by
δb(p,Qb) = arg max
xb∈γ b(p,Qb)
ub(xb).
The budget set γ b(p, Qb) is non-empty as it contains (0, 0L) as an element. It follows that 
δb(p, Qb) is non-empty, since monotonicity of the utility function in money implies that the 
budget constraint can be defined with equality, and the maximization therefore takes place over 
a non-empty finite set of elements.
Given a price vector p ∈ {1} ×RL and a set of rationing constraints Rs ⊂ Ls , the budget set 
of a seller s ∈ S is given by
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The rationing constraints of sellers different from s are irrelevant for the budget set of seller s
and are therefore omitted in the definition of γ s . The demand correspondence δs of seller s is 
defined by
δs(p,Rs) = arg max
xs∈γ s(p,Rs)
us(xs).
Using the same argument as before, it follows that δs(p, Rs) is non-empty.
Definition 3.2. A Drèze equilibrium of the economy E = (T , p, p¯, (ui)i∈I ) is an element 
(p∗, Q∗, R∗, x∗) ∈ ({1} ×RL) ×Q ×R × X such that:
1. For every b ∈ B , x∗b ∈ δb(p∗, Q∗b).
2. For every s ∈ S, x∗s ∈ δs(p∗, R∗s).
3.
∑
i∈I x∗i = (0, 0L).
4. For every  ∈ L, p

≤ p∗ ≤ p¯.
5. For every  ∈ L, if p∗ < p¯, then Q∗ = ∅.
6. For every  ∈ L, if p∗ > p, then R∗ = ∅.
7. For every  ∈ L, Q∗ = ∅ or R∗ = ∅.
The first two conditions in Definition 3.2 reflect the standard optimizing behavior of the buyers 
and the sellers. Buyers and sellers need only know the given prices and their individual rationing 
scheme and need not consider the other individuals in making their choices. The third condition 
expresses market clearing. The fourth condition rules out exchange against prices violating the 
price controls. Condition 5 states that whenever the price of a commodity  is upwards flexible, 
i.e. strictly below the price ceiling p¯, then there is no rationing of the buyers. Similarly, Condi-
tion 6 states that whenever the price of a commodity  is downwards flexible, i.e. strictly above 
the price floor p

, then there is no rationing of the sellers. Condition 7 expresses that markets 
are transparent. There is no simultaneous rationing on the supply and on the demand of a given 
commodity .
When we apply Definition 3.2 to the case with only one commodity, the analysis reduces to 
the standard textbook analysis of the effects of price floors and price ceilings based on supply 
and demand curves.
In the absence of price controls, so when, for every  ∈ L, p

= −∞ and p¯ = +∞, Defi-
nition 3.2 reduces to the standard definition of a Walrasian equilibrium. It follows immediately 
from Conditions 5 and 6 that Q∗ = R∗ = ∅, so Condition 7 is automatically satisfied. Condition 4 
becomes void. What remains are the two standard Conditions 1 and 2, expressing optimization 
without rationing constraints, and the market clearing Condition 3.
For the assignment model of Example 2.2 with price controls, Talman and Yang (2008) define 
the concept of constrained Walrasian equilibrium. It is not difficult to show that the application of 
the Drèze equilibrium of Definition 3.2 to that model coincides with the constrained Walrasian 
equilibrium. Andersson and Svensson (2014) consider the assignment model of Example 2.2
with price controls. They propose the concept of a rationing price equilibrium. The rationing 
price equilibrium is a Drèze equilibrium, but not vice versa.
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Valuations and costs in the economy of Exam-
ple 2.3 with B = {b1, b2, b3}, S = {s1, s2, s3}, and 
L = {1, 2, 3}.
1 2 3
b1 7 8 9
b2 6 7 8
b3 2 3 4
1 2 3
s1 1 3 6
s2 2 4 7
s3 4 6 9
4. An illustration
To illustrate the usefulness of the model, the concepts of stable outcome and Drèze equilib-
rium, and the richness of allocations that result, we now examine the model of Example 2.3 in 
a bit more detail. Consider, for instance, an economy with three buyers, three sellers, and three 
qualities, where valuations and costs are as depicted in Table 1.
First, consider the case without price floors. It can be easily verified that every stable outcome 
A involves two contracts, β(A) = {b1, b2}, σ(A) = {s1, s2}, only quality 1 is traded, λ(A) = {1}, 
and every contract in A trades at a price m in between 2 and 4. Every stable outcome maximizes 
total surplus.
Now let (p∗, Q∗, R∗, x∗) be a Drèze equilibrium. Since there are neither price floors nor 
price ceilings, it holds that Q∗ = R∗ = ∅, and the concept of a Drèze equilibrium reduces to a 
Walrasian equilibrium. Suppose there is trade in quality 2. Then it should hold that p∗2 < p∗1 + 1, 
since otherwise there is no demand for it. At the same time, it should hold that p∗2 > p∗1 +2, since 
otherwise there is no supply of quality 2. It follows that there is no trade in quality 2 at a Drèze 
equilibrium and by a similar argument it can be shown that there is no trade in quality 3, so for 
every i ∈ I , it holds that x∗i2 = x∗i3 = 0, whereas p∗1 +1 ≤ p∗2 ≤ p∗1 +2 and p∗1 +2 ≤ p∗3 ≤ p∗1 +5. 
Now it is easily verified that 2 ≤ p∗1 ≤ 4, x∗b11 = x∗b21 = 1, and x∗s11 = x∗s21 = −1. We also have 
that p∗0 = 1, x∗b10 = x∗b20 = −p∗1 , and x∗s10 = x∗s20 = p∗1 . Finally, it holds that x∗b3 = x∗s3 =
(0, 0L). The allocations that occur in a Drèze equilibrium are exactly the same as those in a 
stable outcome.
Now consider a price floor f ∈ [2, 4]. All of a sudden, Pareto inefficient stable outcomes on 
top of the surplus maximizing stable outcomes of the previous paragraph emerge. Consider, for 
instance, the Pareto inefficient outcome A′ = {(b1, s1, 2, f + 1), (b2, s2, 1, f )}, where buyer b1
trades quality 2 with seller s1 against the price f + 1 and buyer b2 trades quality 1 with seller s2
against the price f .
We verify next that A′ is stable. Obviously, every contract in A′ obeys individual rationality. 
Suppose there is a contract z = (b, s, , m) which gives both b and s strictly higher utility. It 
holds that Ub1(A′) = 8 − f − 1 = 7 − f , so to give b1 strictly higher utility, it should hold that 
 = 1 and m < f , or  = 2 and m < f + 1, or  = 3 and m < f + 2. The first case is not possible 
in the presence of a price floor equal to f . The latter two cases are not possible since the utility 
for s would be lower than Us(A′), irrespective of the choice for s. It follows that b = b1.
The same argument can be used to show that b = b2.
Buyer b3 cannot get a positive utility by consuming quality 1 against price f , and no seller 
can produce quality 2 against a cost lower than vb3 + v2 = 3 or quality 3 against a cost lower 
than vb3 + v3 = 4, so b = b3. This concludes the proof that outcome A′ is stable. This example 
is striking because it shows how Pareto inefficient stable outcomes can exist in the presence of 
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floors.
We now construct a Drèze equilibrium (p∗, Q∗, R∗, x∗) such that x∗ = ξ(A′). We clearly 
need that p∗1 = f and p∗2 = f + 1. Let p∗3 be such that f + 2 ≤ p∗3 ≤ f + 5. Since there are 
no price ceilings in this model, it holds by Condition 5 of Definition 3.2 that Q∗ = ∅. Since the 
prices of qualities 2 and 3 exceed the price floor, there is no supply rationing of these qualities 
by Condition 6 of Definition 3.2 and R∗2 = R∗3 = ∅. At the given prices and rationing schemes, 
it holds that x∗b1 = (−f − 1, 0, 1, 0) ∈ δb1(p∗, Q∗b1), x∗b2 = (−f, 1, 0, 0) ∈ δb2(p∗, Q∗b2), and 
x∗b3 = (0, 0L) ∈ δb3(p∗, Q∗b3). Irrespective of the choice for R∗1 , it holds that 0 ∈ δs3(p∗, R∗s3). 
In the absence of rationing, both seller s1 and seller s2 would strictly prefer to produce quality 1, 
which would result in excess supply of quality 1. Due to the price floor, there is no possibility for 
the price of quality 1 to drop, and one of the two sellers gets rationed on his supply. To achieve 
the allocation ξ(A′), this will be seller s1: R∗1 = {s1}. We now have x∗s1 = (f + 1, 0, −1, 0) ∈
δs1(p∗, R∗s1) and x∗s2 = (f, −1, 0, 0) ∈ δs2(p∗, R∗s2). All the conditions of Definition 3.2 are 
satisfied and the Drèze equilibrium allocation is equal to ξ(A′).
5. Existence of stable outcomes
In this section, we present an adjustment process in the spirit of Gale and Shapley (1962), 
Crawford and Knoer (1981), Kelso and Crawford (1982), Demange et al. (1986), and Hatfield 
and Milgrom (2005) that ends with a stable outcome. The reason for presenting this adjustment 
process is twofold. First, the existence of a stable outcome in our model does not follow from 
existing results in the literature. For instance, Kelso and Crawford (1982) do not allow for price 
rigidities or contracts, whereas Hatfield and Milgrom (2005) rule out indifferences. Secondly, and 
more important, when applied to the special cases of our model as discussed in Section 2, the 
adjustment process coincides with known adjustment processes in the literature. The adjustment 
process therefore unifies the adjustment processes as used in the literature in exactly the same 
way as the model unifies the existing models as discussed in Section 2.
We first reduce the set of possible contracts to a finite subset of Y¯ . Consider some t =
(b, s, ) ∈ T . Without loss of generality, we assume that there is m ∈ [p

, p¯] ∩ R such that 
ub(−m, e()) ≥ ub(0, 0L) and us(m, −e()) ≥ us(0, 0L). Otherwise, a trade can never be part of 
a stable outcome by individual rationality and can be dropped from T . Contracts (t, m) ∈ Y¯ that 
are individually rational for both the buyer and the seller are such that m belongs to a non-empty 
interval [mt, m¯t ], where mt and m¯t are both finite, mt ≥ p, and m¯t ≤ p¯. The details of the 
argument are provided in the appendix, Lemma A.1.
Next, we choose some ε > 0 and define the finite set of contracts Y¯ ε by
Y¯ ε = {(t,m) ∈ Y¯ | ∃k ∈N0 such that m = min{mt + kε, m¯t }}.
In this way, only contracts (t, m) are considered where the difference between m and mt is an 
integer multiple of ε or m = m¯t . Moreover, this definition achieves that m belongs to the interval 
[mt, m¯t ].
The adjustment process is now defined as follows.
Definition 5.1 (Adjustment Process).
Step 1: Initially, the set of permitted contracts Y is equal to Y¯ ε and the set of tentatively accepted 
contracts A is equal to ∅.
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the union of the set of contracts as chosen by b ∈ B \ β(A) and the set A.
Step 3: Every seller s ∈ σ(Z) tentatively accepts one arbitrarily chosen element of Cs(Z). Let 
A be the set of contracts as tentatively accepted by s ∈ σ(Z).
Step 4: The process stops if A = Z. In that case the contracts in A are permanently accepted. 
Otherwise, the process returns to Step 2 with set of permitted contracts Y \ (Z \ A).
Since the set Y is finite and a buyer can always choose ∅, it holds that the set Cb(Y ) in Step 2 
is non-empty. The same remark applies to the set Cs(Z) in Step 3.
It can be easily verified that for the marriage problem of Example 2.1, the adjustment process 
coincides with the deferred acceptance algorithm of Gale and Shapley (1962). For the assignment 
model of Example 2.2, the adjustment process coincides with the approximate auction mecha-
nism as discussed in Section V of Demange et al. (1986). In the case without ties, the adjustment 
process coincides with the generalized Gale–Shapley algorithm of Hatfield and Milgrom (2005).
A stable outcome A for the set of feasible contracts Y¯ ε is defined as in Definition 3.1 with Y¯
replaced by Y¯ ε . Theorem A.2 in the appendix shows that the adjustment process of Definition 5.1
terminates in a finite number of steps with a set A of permanently accepted contracts, which is 
a stable outcome for the set of feasible contracts Y¯ ε . A limit argument can now be used to 
demonstrate the existence of a stable outcome in the model without a smallest monetary unit.
Theorem 5.2. Consider an economy E = (T , p, p¯, (ui)i∈I ). A stable outcome exists.
Proof. See Appendix.
6. Equivalence of stable outcomes and Drèze equilibria
Shapley and Shubik (1971) consider the assignment game and prove that the set of stable 
payoffs coincides with the set of competitive equilibrium payoffs. This relationship between sta-
ble outcomes and competitive equilibria has been substantially generalized, in the direction with 
general, not necessarily quasi-linear, utility functions by Kaneko (1982) and Quinzii (1984) and 
in the direction of set-ups with many-to-many matching or even trading networks as demon-
strated by Hatfield et al. (2013). These results are invariably derived in a setting with unlimited 
monetary transfers, or, equivalently, absence of price controls. In this section, we obtain a fully 
general equivalence between stable outcomes and Drèze equilibria. This equivalence boils down 
to the equivalence with competitive equilibria in the absence of price controls, presents a com-
pletely new result for cases with no monetary transfers like the marriage problem, and also deals 
with all intermediate cases like wage or rent controls.
The concepts of stable outcome and Drèze equilibrium are not directly comparable. On the 
one hand, a stable outcome provides more information, as it is specified who trades with whom. 
On the other hand, in a Drèze equilibrium also the prices of commodities that are not traded are 
specified and a Drèze equilibrium specifies explicit rationing constraints.
Although it is not possible to directly compare a stable outcome to a Drèze equilibrium, we 
can compare the resulting allocations. In fact, this is all that matters from a welfare point of view.
Consider an economy E = (T , p, p¯, (ui)i∈I ). The set of allocations corresponding to stable 
outcomes is Xso,
Xso = {x ∈ X | there is a stable outcome A such that ξ(A) = x}.
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XD = {x∗ ∈ X | there is (p∗,Q∗,R∗) such that (p∗,Q∗,R∗, x∗) is a Drèze equilibrium}.
The next result shows that if A is a stable outcome, then there is a Drèze equilibrium with 
allocation ξ(A).
Theorem 6.1. Consider an economy E = (T , p, p¯, (ui)i∈I ). It holds that Xso ⊂ XD.
Proof. See Appendix.
Consider some stable outcome A. Step 1 in the proof of Theorem 6.1 shows that each com-
modity in λ(A) trades at a single price. Indeed, for every y, y ′ ∈ A such that λ(y) = λ(y′) it holds 
that μ(y) = μ(y ′). Intuitively, whenever two contracts involve different amounts of money, the 
buyer paying the high amount wants to match with the seller receiving the low amount, and write 
a contract with an amount of money somewhere in the middle. Since T has a product structure, 
such a match is feasible. This makes it possible to use the stable outcome A in the construction 
of a Drèze equilibrium, where a commodity trades against a single price by definition. The price 
of a commodity  ∈ λ(A) is denoted by p∗ .
For  ∈ L and b ∈ β(Y¯), the extended real number rb denotes the reservation value of com-
modity  for buyer b. By definition, it is equal to the value of m for which ub(−m, e()) =
ub(x∗b), where x∗b is the consumption bundle of buyer b as induced by the stable outcome A.1
The highest reservation value among all buyers in β(Y¯) is denoted by rB . Similarly, for  ∈ L
and s ∈ σ(Y¯), rs denotes the reservation value of commodity  for seller s, so us(rs , −e()) =
us(x∗s), and rS denotes the lowest reservation value among all sellers in σ(Y¯).
In Step 3 of the proof of Theorem 6.1 it is shown that for any traded commodity  ∈ λ(A)
at least one of three cases holds. The first possibility is that p∗ = p and rS ≤ p = rB . In 
this case, a seller s may have a reservation value rs < p, but the price floor p prevents a price 
decrease and the seller is rationed on his supply of commodity . Since none of the buyers b has a 
reservation value rb > p
∗
 , there is no need for rationing buyers on their demand of commodity .
The second possibility is that p

≤ p∗ ≤ p¯ and rS = p∗ = rB . This case corresponds to a 
market without effective price controls and absence of rationing. It will always occur when the 
price floor p

is equal to −∞ and the price ceiling p¯ is equal to +∞.
The third possibility of Step 3 parallels the first one with the role of buyers replaced by sellers. 
It holds that p∗ = p¯ and rS = p¯ ≤ rB . In this case, a buyer b may have a reservation value 
rb > p¯, but the price ceiling p¯ prevents a price increase and the buyer is rationed on his demand 
of commodity . Since none of the sellers s has a reservation value rs < p
∗
 , there is no need for 
rationing sellers on their supply of commodity .
In degenerate cases, the first and the third possibility can occur simultaneously. In this case 
the price floor must be equal to the price ceiling, the lowest reservation value among sellers, and 
the highest reservation value among buyers. The behavior of the market resembles the one of the 
second possibility. There are no effective price controls and there is absence of rationing.
In Step 4 of the proof of Theorem 6.1 it is shown that for any non-traded commodity  ∈
L \ λ(A) at least one of three cases holds. The first possibility is that rB ≤ p. In that case, the 
1 In the proof, we also deal carefully with the cases where ub(−m, e()) < ub(x∗b) for all m ∈R and ub(−m, e()) >
ub(x∗b) for all m ∈R.
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value among sellers of commodity  may be higher or lower than rB . In case it is lower, welfare 
gains could be achieved by contracts among such a seller and a buyer with a strictly higher 
reservation value. Since rS can be strictly below the price floor p, supply rationing of sellers 
may occur in equilibrium. Since rB ≤ p, there will be no simultaneous rationing of the demand 
of buyers. The equilibrium price p∗ of such a non-traded commodity can be set equal to p
if p

> −∞. If p

= −∞, and therefore rB = −∞, so none of the buyers have an interest to 
acquire commodity  against any price, p∗ can be set equal to any value less than or equal to the 
price ceiling p¯ and the lowest reservation value among all sellers rS .
The second possibility concerns the case where rB < r
S
 , p
< rB , and r
S
 < p¯. The market 
for such a commodity resembles a market without price controls and does not involve any ra-
tioning. Commodity  does simply not admit a profitable trade among a buyer and a seller in this 
case. The equilibrium price of such a commodity can be any value in between rB and r
S
 .
The third possibility of Step 4 is the case where p¯ ≤ rS . This is the analogue of the first 
possibility with buyers replaced by sellers. The price ceiling is so low that all potential supply 
of commodity  is wiped out. If the highest reservation value among buyers exceeds p¯, then 
demand rationing of such buyers occurs. The equilibrium price of such a commodity is taken 
equal to p¯ if p¯ < +∞ and equal to any value greater than or equal to p and rB otherwise.
The first and third possibility of Step 4 can occur simultaneously, also in non-degenerate 
cases. In this case, the market for commodity  is characterized by the absence of any supply and 
demand.
Step 5 of the proof of Theorem 6.1 defines prices of non-traded commodities in accordance 
with the requirements as coming out of Step 4. Step 6 defines rationing constraints on supply 
and demand in accordance with the requirements of Step 3 and Step 4. Step 7 verifies that the 
resulting prices, rationing schemes, and allocation satisfy Condition 1 of Definition 3.2. Step 8 
does the same for Condition 2, Step 9 for Conditions 3, 4, 5, and 6, and Step 10 for Condition 7. 
This completes the proof of Theorem 6.1.
Theorem 5.2 asserts that a stable outcome exists. Using Theorem 6.1, we can then infer the 
existence of a Drèze equilibrium as a corollary.
Corollary 6.2. Consider an economy E = (T , p, p¯, (ui)i∈I ). A Drèze equilibrium exists.
The next result presents the converse of Theorem 6.1. If (p∗, Q∗, R∗, x∗) is a Drèze equilib-
rium, then there is a stable outcome A such that ξ(A) = x∗.
Theorem 6.3. Consider an economy E = (T , p, p¯, (ui)i∈I ). It holds that XD ⊂ Xso.
Proof. See Appendix.
The proof of Theorem 6.3 consists of three easy steps. The first step takes some Drèze equilib-
rium and defines an associated outcome by specifying a matching between buyers and sellers that 
is compatible with the given Drèze equilibrium. The second step verifies individual rationality of 
the outcome and the third step absence of blocking by a two-player coalition.
Combining the results of Theorem 6.1 and Theorem 6.3 leads to the following corollary.
Corollary 6.4. Consider an economy E = (T , p, p¯, (ui)i∈I ). It holds that Xso = XD.
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of core outcomes. The relation between the core and competitive equilibrium is a classical prob-
lem in economics, dating back to Edgeworth (1881). In general, competitive equilibria belong 
to the core, but the core contains other allocations as well. In models of perfectly competitive 
economies, where agents are infinitely small, the core coincides with the set of competitive allo-
cations. Debreu and Scarf (1963) obtain a core convergence result by showing that the set of core 
allocations shrinks to the competitive allocation when an economy is replicated. Aumann (1964)
obtains a core equivalence result, showing that the core coincides with the set of competitive equi-
librium allocations when there is a continuum of traders. This paper therefore delimits another 
class of economies where the core coincides with the set of equilibrium allocations. Moreover, 
agents need not be infinitely small. Where usually the equilibrium concepts are thought as more 
appealing in a set-up with many individuals that view themselves as an insignificant part of a 
large market and the cooperative concepts are thought to be more appropriate in situations with 
few players, both approaches coincide here irrespective of the number of agents.
7. Conclusion
This paper considers a discrete matching with contracts framework where contracts are sub-
ject to price controls. The framework is sufficiently general to admit many important models as 
special cases, like for instance the marriage problem of Gale and Shapley (1962), the assignment 
model without price controls of Shapley and Shubik (1971), the assignment model subject to 
price controls as in Talman and Yang (2008) or Andersson and Svensson (2014), and the quality 
competition model subject to price controls of Hatfield et al. (2012).
The paper presents an adjustment process that always terminates with a stable outcome for 
the discretized version of the model. For the marriage problem, the adjustment process coin-
cides with the deferred acceptance algorithm, for the assignment model without price controls, 
the adjustment process coincides with the approximate auction mechanism as discussed in Sec-
tion V of Demange et al. (1986), and in the case without ties, the adjustment process coincides 
with the generalized Gale–Shapley algorithm of Hatfield and Milgrom (2005). A limit argument 
demonstrates the existence of a stable outcome in a model without a smallest monetary unit.
The paper also develops an equilibrium concept for the framework under consideration. In 
the presence of price floors and price ceilings, rationing may be needed to clear the markets. 
In the equilibrium approach, rationing constraints cannot be arbitrary. Rationing on the demand 
side is only allowed in the presence of price ceilings and rationing on the demand side only in 
the presence of price floors. Rationing on supply and demand cannot occur simultaneously in a 
given market: markets are transparent. Buyers and sellers take prices and rationing constraints 
as given and maximize their utility given these constraints. At equilibrium, prices and rationing 
schemes are endogenously determined to equalize supply and demand of all commodities. The 
equilibrium concept is an extension of the concept of Drèze (1975) as developed for economies 
with divisible commodities.
The relationship between solution concepts coming from matching theory and those resulting 
from competitive analysis is an important topic of research. This paper contributes to this litera-
ture by showing that the set of stable allocations according to the matching approach is the same 
as the set of Drèze equilibrium allocations in the presence of price controls like price floors or 
price ceilings. Since price floors can be set equal to minus infinity and price ceilings to plus in-
finity, the case with absence of price floors and price ceilings is a special case. In this case, Drèze 
equilibria are equivalent to Walrasian equilibria and the result specializes to the equivalence be-
P.J.J. Herings / Journal of Economic Theory 177 (2018) 222–244 237tween Walrasian equilibria and stable outcomes. Since price floors and price ceilings can be both 
set equal to zero, the case without monetary transfers is a special case as well. As an example, 
the set of Drèze equilibria leads to a set of allocations that is equal to the one induced by stable 
outcomes in the marriage problem. Finally, there are many cases of interest in between unlim-
ited monetary transfers and absence thereof, for instance, when studying the effects of minimum 
wages or rent controls.
Important generalizations of the current model concern the extension to the cases of many-
to-one matching, many-to-many matching, and networks of agents who can trade contracts as in 
Ostrovsky (2008) and Hatfield et al. (2013). Such a generalization would require the adaptation 
of the concept of competitive equilibrium. Already in the case of many-to-one matching, it fol-
lows from examples in Kaneko (1982) that a product structure is not sufficient to guarantee that 
a single commodity trades against a single price. The appropriate competitive equilibrium con-
cept would be one that involves personalized prices as in Hatfield et al. (2013). Existence would 
be another issue, since it follows from Hatfield and Kominers (2012) that without continuous 
transfers, in markets that lack a vertical structure, stable outcomes may not exist.
Appendix A. Lemma A.1, Theorem A.2, Proof of Theorems 5.2, 6.1, and 6.3
Lemma A.1. Consider an economy E = (T , p, p¯, (ui)i∈I ). Let t = (b, s, ) ∈ T be such that 
there is m ∈ [p

, p¯] ∩ R such that ub(−m, e()) ≥ ub(0, 0L) and us(m, −e()) ≥ us(0, 0L). 
Then there is mt, m¯t ∈ R with p ≤ mt ≤ m¯t ≤ p¯ such that (t, m) ∈ Y¯ is individually rational for both b and s if and only if m ∈ [mt, m¯t ].
Proof. To define mt , we distinguish two cases. In the first case, p = −∞. Let mt ∈ R be the 
unique amount of money such that us(mt , −e()) = us(0, 0L). Since it has been assumed that 
for every  ∈ Ls such that p

= −∞, there is m ∈ R such that us(m, −e()) ≤ us(0, 0L) and 
there is m ∈ [p

, p¯] ∩ R such that us(m, −e()) ≥ us(0, 0L), and us is strongly monotonic in 
x0, it holds that mt is uniquely determined. In the second case, it holds that p = −∞. Either 
us(p

, −e()) ≥ us(0, 0L) and we define mt = p, or us(p, −e()) < us(0, 0L) and we define 
mt ∈R as the unique amount of money such that us(mt , −e()) = us(0, 0L).
We define m¯t in a similar way. If p¯ = +∞, then let m¯t ∈R be the unique amount of money 
such that ub(−m¯t , e()) = ub(0, 0L). If p¯ = +∞, then either ub(−p¯, e()) ≥ ub(0, 0L) and 
we define m¯t = p¯, or ub(−p¯, e()) < ub(0, 0L) and we define m¯t ∈R as the unique amount of 
money such that ub(−m¯t , e()) = ub(0, 0L).
It is easily verified that p

≤ mt ≤ m¯t ≤ p¯.
It is immediate from the definitions of mt and m¯t that (t, m) ∈ Y¯ is individually rational for 
both b and s if and only if m ∈ [mt, m¯t ]. 
Theorem A.2. The adjustment process of Definition 5.1 terminates in a finite number of steps 
with a set A of permanently accepted contracts. The set A is a stable outcome for the set of 
feasible contracts Y¯ ε .
Proof. Suppose the adjustment process does not terminate in a finite number of steps. Then, in 
Step 4 of each iteration, the set Z \ A is non-empty and the cardinality of the set Y in the next 
iteration diminishes by at least one. Since the initial set Y as defined in Step 1 has finitely many 
elements, this leads to a contradiction.
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in at most one contract in A, and by Step 3 every seller is involved in at most one contract in A, 
it follows that A is an outcome.
For every (m, t) ∈ Y¯ ε , the definitions of mt and m¯t guarantee individual rationality for both the 
buyer and the seller involved in trade t . It follows that Condition 1 of Definition 3.1 is satisfied.
Consider the finite sequence of sets of tentatively accepted contracts as generated in the vari-
ous iterations of the adjustment process and the associated finite sequence of utilities of a seller s. 
The finite sequence of utilities is weakly increasing at each iteration. Indeed, the first, if any, ten-
tatively accepted contract by seller s gives utility at least equal to Us(0, 0L) since all contracts 
in Y¯ ε are individual rational for seller s. Next, a seller can keep a tentatively accepted contract 
forever, or rejects it in favor of a contract that gives at least the same utility.
Suppose there is z = (b, s, , m) ∈ Y¯ ε such that Ub({z}) > Ub(A) and Us({z}) > Us(A). 
Then, at some iteration of the adjustment process, z has been rejected in Step 3 by seller s. The 
tentatively accepted contract by seller s in that iteration, say y, is such that Us({y}) ≥ Us({z}). 
Since the utility of the tentatively accepted contract by seller s is weakly increasing at each 
iteration, it holds that Us(A) ≥ Us({y}) ≥ Us({z}), leading to a contradiction. Consequently, 
Condition 2 of Definition 3.1 is satisfied. 
Theorem 5.2. Consider an economy E = (T , p, p¯, (ui)i∈I ). A stable outcome exists.
Proof. Consider the sequence (εn)n∈N with εn = 2−n and let An be the outcome that is generated 
by the adjustment process of Definition 5.1 for the set of feasible contracts Y¯ εn . By listing the, 
potentially empty, contracts of the buyers, we can represent every An as an element of the set
(S × L × [m,m¯] ∪ {∅})B, (A.1)
where m is a finite lower bound for {mt | t ∈ T } and m¯ is a finite upper bound for {m¯t | t ∈ T }. 
We can identify the elements of S, L, and {∅} with distinct points in Euclidean space. Then the 
set in (A.1) is compact under the induced topology. The sequence An therefore has a convergent 
subsequence, denoted by (Ank )k∈N, with limit, say, A.
The remainder of the proof verifies that A is a stable outcome.
It clearly holds that A ⊂ Y¯ is an outcome and that every contract (t, m) ∈ A satisfies mt ≤ m ≤
m¯t . Condition 1 of Definition 3.1 corresponding to individual rationality is therefore satisfied 
by A.
Suppose that there is z = (b, s, , m) ∈ Y¯ such that Ub({z}) > Ub(A) and Us({z}) > Us(A). 
Since A satisfies individual rationality, it follows that mb,s, ≤ m ≤ m¯b,s,. Then there is n′ ∈ N
and y = (b, s, , m˜) ∈ Y¯ εn′ such that Ub({y}) > Ub(A) and Us({y}) > Us(A). Observe that, for 
every n ≥ n′, y ∈ Y¯ εn .
Let k′ be such that, for every k ≥ k′, Ub({y}) > Ub(Ank ) and Us({y}) > Us(Ank ). Let k∗
be such that nk∗ ≥ max{n′, nk′ }. It follows that b and s can use y ∈ Y¯ εnk∗ to block outcome 
Ank∗ , thereby violating that Ank∗ is stable for the set of feasible contracts Y¯
εnk∗
. Consequently, 
A satisfies Condition 2 of Definition 3.1. 
Theorem 6.1. Consider an economy E = (T , p, p¯, (ui)i∈I ). It holds that Xso ⊂ XD.
Proof. Consider some x∗ ∈ Xso and let A be a stable outcome such that ξ(A) = x∗. We prove 
the result in ten steps.
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holds that μ(y) = μ(y′).
Suppose μ(y) = μ(y′) and without loss of generality assume μ(y) < μ(y′). Consider the 
contract
z = (b, s, λ(y), 12μ(y) + 12μ(y′)),
where b = β(y′) and s = σ(y). Since
p
λ(y)
≤ μ(y) < 12μ(y) + 12μ(y′) < μ(y′) ≤ p¯λ(y),
and the set of traders in commodity  has a product structure, it holds that z ∈ Y¯ . The utilities 
corresponding to z are equal to
Ub({z}) = ub(− 12μ(y) − 12μ(y′), e(λ(y))) > ub(−μ(y′), e(λ(y′))) = Ub(A),
Us({z}) = us( 12μ(y) + 12μ(y′),−e(λ(y))) > us(μ(y),−e(λ(y))) = Us(A),
so Condition 2 of Definition 3.1 is violated and the outcome A is not stable, a contradiction. 
Consequently, for every y, y ′ ∈ A such that λ(y) = λ(y′) it holds that μ(y) = μ(y′).
Step 2. Definition of prices for traded commodities and reservation values for all commodities.
For every  ∈ λ(A), we denote the price at which  is traded by p∗ , so for every y ∈ A such 
that λ(y) =  it holds that μ(y) = p∗ .
Consider some  ∈ L and some b ∈ β(Y¯). If, for every m ∈R, ub(−m, e()) > ub(x∗b), then 
we define rb = +∞ and ub(−∞, e()) = limm→+∞ ub(−m, e()). Notice that by the assump-
tions on ub, it holds that p¯ < +∞ in this case. It also holds that ub(−∞, e()) ≥ ub(x∗b). 
If, for every m ∈ R, ub(−m, e()) < ub(x∗b), then we define rb = −∞ and ub(+∞, e()) =
limm→−∞ ub(−m, e()). It holds that ub(+∞, e()) ≤ ub(x∗b). Otherwise, let rb ∈ R be such 
that ub(−rb , e()) = ub(x∗b). We define rB = maxb∈β(Y¯) rb .
Consider some  ∈ L and some s ∈ σ(Y¯). If, for every m ∈R, us(m, −e()) > us(x∗s), then 
we define rs = −∞ and us(−∞, −e()) = limm→−∞ us(m, −e()). Notice that by the assump-
tions on us , it holds that p

> −∞ in this case. It also holds that us(−∞, −e()) ≥ us(x∗s). 
If, for every m ∈ R, us(m, −e()) < us(x∗s), then we define rs = +∞ and us(+∞, −e()) =
limm→+∞ us(m, −e()). It holds that us(+∞, −e()) ≤ us(x∗s). Otherwise, let rs ∈ R be such 
that us(rs , −e()) = us(x∗s). We define rS = mins∈σ(Y¯) rs .
It holds by definition that rb = p∗ = rs for every (b, s, , m) ∈ A.
Step 3. For every  ∈ λ(A) at least one of the following three cases holds:
1. p∗ = p and rS ≤ p = rB ,
2. p

< p∗ < p¯ and r
S
 = p∗ = rB ,
3. p∗ = p¯ and rS = p¯ ≤ rB .
It follows from the definitions in Step 2 that, for every (b, s, , m) ∈ A, rb = p∗ = rs , so it 
follows that rS ≤ p∗ ≤ rB .
Consider some  ∈ L. It clearly holds that a. p∗ = p, or b. p < p∗ < p¯, or c. p∗ = p¯. Each 
of the Cases a, b, and c is considered in turn and shown to lead to at least one of the Cases 1, 2, 
and 3 of Step 3.
Case a. p∗ = p . 
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rS = p. Suppose not, then rS ≤ p∗ = p implies rS < p. Let b ∈ β(Y¯) be such that rb = rB , 
let s ∈ σ(Y¯) be such that rs = rS , and consider the contract z = (b, s, , p). Since the set of 
traders in commodity  has a product structure, it holds that z ∈ Y¯ . The utilities corresponding to 
z are equal to
Ub({z}) = ub(−p

, e()) > ub(−rb , e()) ≥ ub(x∗b),
Us({z}) = us(p

,−e()) > us(rs ,−e()) ≥ us(x∗s),
so Condition 2 of Definition 3.1 is violated and the outcome A is not stable, a contradiction. 
Consequently, it holds that rS = p.
We argue next that p

= p¯. Suppose not, then it holds that p < p¯. Let b ∈ β(Y¯) be 
such that rb = rB , let s ∈ σ(Y¯) be such that rs = rS , and let m ∈ R be such that p < m <
min{p¯, rB }. The contract z = (b, s, , m) belongs to Y¯ since the set of traders in commodity 
has a product structure and p

< m < p¯. The utilities corresponding to z are equal to
Ub({z}) = ub(−m,e()) > ub(−rb , e()) ≥ ub(x∗b),
Us({z}) = us(m,−e()) > us(p

,−e()) = us(rs ,−e()) ≥ us(x∗s).
Condition 2 of Definition 3.1 is violated and the outcome A is not stable, a contradiction. Con-
sequently, it holds that p

= p¯. Now Case 3 of Step 3 holds and we are done.
Case b. p

< p∗ < p¯.
Suppose that Case 2 of Step 3 does not hold. We end up in Subcase (b.i). rS < p∗ ≤ rB or 
Subcase (b.ii). rS ≤ p∗ < rB .
In Subcase (b.i), let b ∈ β(Y¯) be such that rb = rB , let s ∈ σ(Y¯) be such that rs = rS , 
and let m ∈ R be such that max{p

, rS } < m < p∗ . The contract z = (b, s, , m) belongs to Y¯
since the set of traders in commodity  has a product structure and p

< m < p¯. The utilities 
corresponding to z are equal to
Ub({z}) = ub(−m,e()) > ub(−p∗ , e()) ≥ ub(−rb , e()) ≥ ub(x∗b),
Us({z}) = us(m,−e()) > us(rs ,−e()) ≥ us(x∗s),
so Condition 2 of Definition 3.1 is violated and the outcome A is not stable, a contradiction.
In Subcase (b.ii), let b ∈ β(Y¯) be such that rb = rB , let s ∈ σ(Y¯) be such that rs = rS , 
and let m ∈ R be such that p∗ < m < min{p¯, rB }. The contract z = (b, s, , m) belongs to Y¯
since the set of traders in commodity  has a product structure and p

< m < p¯. The utilities 
corresponding to z are equal to
Ub({z}) = ub(−m,e()) > ub(−rb , e()) ≥ ub(x∗b),
Us({z}) = us(m,−e()) > us(p∗ ,−e()) ≥ us(rs ,−e()) ≥ us(x∗s),
so Condition 2 of Definition 3.1 is violated and the outcome A is not stable, a contradiction.
Since both Subcases (b.i) and (b.ii) lead to a contradiction, our supposition is false, so Case 2 
of Step 3 holds and we are done.
Case c. p∗ = p¯.
By an argument completely symmetric to the one of Case a, Case 1 or Case 3 of Step 3 can 
be shown to hold.
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1. rB ≤ p,
2. p

< rB ≤ rS < p¯,
3. rS ≥ p¯.
Suppose not. Then there is  ∈ L \ λ(A) such that
rB > p
, rS < p¯, and r
B
 > r
S
 .
Take b ∈ β(Y¯) with rb = rB and s ∈ σ(Y¯) with rs = rS . Since rB = −∞ and rS = +∞, it 
holds that ub(−rb , e()) ≥ ub(x∗b) and us(rs , −e()) ≥ us(x∗s). Let m ∈ R be such that p ≤
m ≤ p¯ and rS < m < rB . Since p ≤ m ≤ p¯ and the set of traders in commodity  has a product 
structure, it holds that z = (b, s, m, ) ∈ Y¯ . The utilities corresponding to z are equal to
Ub({z}) = ub(−m,e()) > ub(−rb , e()) ≥ ub(x∗b),
Us({z}) = us(m,−e()) > us(rs ,−e()) ≥ us(x∗s),
so Condition 2 of Definition 3.1 is violated and the outcome A is not stable, a contradiction. The 
result as stated in Step 4 follows.
Step 5. Definition of prices for non-traded commodities.
Choose any  ∈ L \ λ(A). Using Step 4, exactly one of the following three cases holds.
Case 1. rB ≤ p. If p > −∞, then define p∗ = p. Consider the case p = −∞. Since 
p

= −∞, it holds that rS > −∞. Define p∗ = min{p¯, rS , 0}.
Case 2.p

< rB ≤ rS < p¯. Define p∗ = (rB + rS )/2.
Case 3.p

< rB and p¯ ≤ rS . If p¯ < +∞, then define p∗ = p¯. If p¯ = +∞, then define 
p∗ = rB .
Step 6. Definition of rationing constraints.
For every buyer, we introduce rationing constraints for those commodities that he does not 
trade but would like to trade and which have a price equal to the price ceiling,
Q∗ = {(b, ) ∈ B × L |  ∈ Lb \ λ(Ab) and rb > p∗ = p¯}. (A.2)
For every seller, we introduce rationing constraints for those commodities that he does not 
trade but would like to trade and which have a price equal to the price floor,
R∗ = {(s, ) ∈ S × L |  ∈ Ls \ λ(As) and rs < p∗ = p}. (A.3)
Step 7. (p∗, Q∗, R∗, x∗) satisfies Condition 1 of Definition 3.2.
Consider some b ∈ B . Suppose x∗b /∈ δb(p∗, Q∗b). Take some xb ∈ δb(p∗, Q∗b). It follows 
that xb = 0 since otherwise Ab /∈ Cb(A), thereby violating Condition 1 of Definition 3.1. Let 
 ∈ Lb be such that xb = 1. It follows that  /∈ Q∗b . By (A.2) it must be that  ∈ λ(Ab) or rb ≤ p∗
or p∗ < p¯. The first two cases imply ub(xb) = ub(x∗b) and ub(xb) ≤ ub(x∗b), respectively, 
leading to a contradiction. For the last case we distinguish two subcases: (i)  ∈ Lb \ λ(A) and 
(ii)  ∈ λ(A).
For subcase (i), using p∗ < p¯, it follows from the definition in Step 5 that rB ≤ p∗ . At the 
same time, ub(xb) > ub(x∗b) implies p∗ < rb ≤ rB , so we have obtained a contradiction.  
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Step 3 do not hold. Since p∗ < p¯, Case 3 of Step 3 is violated as well, so we have obtained a 
contradiction. Consequently, it holds that x∗b ∈ δb(p∗, Q∗b).
Step 8. (p∗, Q∗, R∗, x∗) satisfies Condition 2 of Definition 3.2.
Consider some s ∈ S. Suppose x∗s /∈ δs(p∗, R∗s). Take some xs ∈ δs(p∗, R∗s). It follows that 
xs = 0 since otherwise As /∈ Cs(A), thereby violating Condition 1 of Definition 3.1. Let  ∈ Ls
be such that xs = −1. It follows that  /∈ R∗s . By (A.3) it must be that  ∈ λ(As) or rs ≥ p∗
or p∗ > p. The first two cases imply u
s(xs) = us(x∗s) and us(xs) ≤ us(x∗s), respectively, 
leading to a contradiction. For the last case we distinguish two subcases: (i)  ∈ Ls \ λ(A) and 
(ii)  ∈ λ(A).
For subcase (i), using p∗ > p, it follows from the definition in Step 5 that rS ≥ p∗ . At the 
same time, us(xs) > us(x∗s) implies p∗ > r
s
 ≥ rS , so we have obtained a contradiction.
For subcase (ii), since us(xs) > us(x∗s), it holds that p∗ > rs ≥ rS , so Cases 2 and 3 of 
Step 3 do not hold. Since p∗ > p, Case 1 of Step 3 is violated as well, so we have obtained a 
contradiction. Consequently, it holds that x∗s ∈ δs(p∗, R∗s).
Step 9. (p∗, Q∗, R∗, x∗) satisfies Conditions 3, 4, 5, and 6 of Definition 3.2.
It follows from (3.1) that
∑
i∈I
x∗i =
∑
i∈I
ξ i(A) = 0,
and therefore Condition 3 of Definition 3.2 is satisfied.
The definition of prices for traded commodities in Step 2 implies that for every  ∈ λ(A), 
p

≤ p∗ ≤ p¯. The definition of prices for non-traded commodities in Step 5 implies that for 
every  ∈ L \ λ(A), p

≤ p∗ ≤ p¯. Therefore, Condition 4 of Definition 3.2 is satisfied.
It follows from (A.2) that, for every  ∈ L, if p∗ < p¯, then Q∗ = ∅, and therefore Condition 5 
of Definition 3.2 is satisfied. It follows from (A.3) that, for every  ∈ L, if p∗ > p, then R∗ = ∅, 
and therefore Condition 6 of Definition 3.2 is satisfied.
Step 10. (p∗, Q∗, R∗, x∗) satisfies Condition 7 of Definition 3.2.
Suppose there is  ∈ L such that Q∗ = ∅ and R∗ = ∅. From (A.2) and (A.3) it follows that 
there is b ∈ B and s ∈ S such that p

= p∗ = p¯ and rs < p∗ < rb , so in particular rS < p∗ < rB . 
If  ∈ λ(A), then none of the cases in Step 3 holds, a contradiction. If  ∈ L \ λ(A), then none of 
the cases in Step 4 holds, a contradiction. Consequently, for every  ∈ L, Q∗ = ∅ or R∗ = ∅, and 
Condition 7 of Definition 3.2 is satisfied.
We conclude that (p∗, Q∗, R∗, x∗) is a Drèze equilibrium and therefore x∗ ∈ XD. 
Theorem 6.3. Consider an economy E = (T , p, p¯, (ui)i∈I ). It holds that XD ⊂ Xso.
Proof. Step 1. Definition of a stable outcome.
By Corollary 6.2, the set XD is non-empty. Take some x∗ ∈ XD and choose (p∗, Q∗, R∗) ∈
({1} × RL) × Q × R such that (p∗, Q∗, R∗, x∗) is a Drèze equilibrium. For every  ∈ L with 
x∗ = 0, Condition 3 of Definition 3.2 implies that there are exactly as many buyers as sellers. 
Match every buyer b ∈ B with x∗b = 1 to a seller s(b) ∈ S with x∗s(b) = −1, so in particular b =
b′ implies s(b) = s(b′), and define a contract yb = (b, s(b), , p∗ ). We define A as the set of all 
such contracts, A = ∪{b∈B|x∗b =(0,0L)}{yb}. It clearly holds that, for every i ∈ I , Ui(A) = ui(x∗i ), 
and ξ(A) = x∗.
Step 2. For every i ∈ I , Ai ∈ Ci(A).
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δb(p∗, Q∗b). Consequently, it holds for every b ∈ B that Ab ∈ Cb(A).
Suppose for some s ∈ S, As /∈ Cs(A), so us(0, 0L) > us(x∗s), a contradiction to x∗s ∈
δs(p∗, R∗s). Consequently, it holds for every s ∈ S that As ∈ Cs(A).
It follows that Condition 1 of Definition 3.1 is satisfied.
Step 3. For every z ∈ Y¯ it holds that Ub({z}) ≤ Ub(A) or Us({z}) ≤ Us(A).
Suppose there is z = (b, s, , m) ∈ Y¯ such that Ub({z}) > Ub(A) = ub(x∗b) and Us({z}) >
Us(A) = us(x∗s). By Condition 7 of Definition 3.2, it holds that Q∗ = ∅ or R∗ = ∅.
Consider the case with Q∗ = ∅ first. Since x∗b ∈ δb(p∗, Q∗b) and Ub({z}) > ub(x∗b), it holds 
that (−m, e()) /∈ γ b(p∗, Q∗b). Since there is no demand rationing of commodity , it now fol-
lows that m < p∗ . Since z ∈ Y¯ , this implies in turn that p < p∗ , so, according to Condition 6 
of Definition 3.2, R∗ = ∅. Since there is no supply rationing of commodity , Us({z}) > us(x∗s)
implies that m > p∗ , and we have obtained a contradiction.
Consider next the case with R∗ = ∅. Since x∗s ∈ δs(p∗, R∗s) and Us({z}) > us(x∗s), it holds 
that (m, −e()) /∈ γ s(p∗, R∗s). Since there is no supply rationing of commodity , it now follows 
that m > p∗ . Since z ∈ Y¯ , this implies in turn that p¯ > p∗ , so, according to Condition 5 of 
Definition 3.2, Q∗ = ∅. Since there is no demand rationing of commodity , Ub({z}) > ub(x∗b)
implies that m < p∗ , and again we have obtained a contradiction.
It follows that Condition 2 of Definition 3.1 is satisfied.
The outcome A is stable and therefore ξ(A) = x∗ ∈ Xso. 
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